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Abstract
We introduce the effect of the political regime in a model of North-South bilateral foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and test whether it matters for the nature of FDI inflows to 
emerging markets. Alternative political regimes in the host country may affect the 
incentive for foreign investors to implement horizontal rather than vertical FDI, if the 
political expropriation risk is different for the two kinds of investment. We test the model
in a panel of 14 source countries and 24 host countries over 1992-2004, and find that 
autocracies are likely to receive relatively more FDI of the vertical type, while 
democracies are more likely to be associated with horizontal FDI inflows.
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31. Introduction
The rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to emerging countries is a key element 
of the recent globalization. Since the early nineties, and throughout the beginning of this 
century, FDI inflows have amounted to a large portion of the emerging markets’ GDP 
(see Figure 1). Interestingly, among major FDI recipients there are both democratic 
countries and autocracies (e.g. China, Egypt, Morocco, according to the classification of 
best renowned academic sources). In principle, democracy may affect a host-country's 
FDI attractiveness in at least two ways: first, by raising total factor productivity hence the 
expected return on investment; second, by reinforcing property rights and reducing the 
risk of expropriation for foreign investors. Another research question is whether
alternative political regimes in the host country might affect the incentive for foreign 
investors to implement horizontal rather than vertical FDI.
In this paper, we introduce the effect of the political regime in a simple model of North-
South bilateral FDI, where horizontal FDI (HFDI) is “market seeking”, while vertical 
FDI (VFDI) is mainly “cost-saving”.1 Anecdotal evidence from firms’ experience
suggests that FDI to emerging markets is based on a mix of “vertical” and “horizontal” 
motivations. The empirical literature has either shown little evidence of purely vertical 
FDI, or that it is difficult to identify VFDI, while there is considerable support for the 
HFDI hypothesis. Some studies have been concentrating on finding better measures of 
relative endowments to solve the ‘vertical’ FDI puzzle: interestingly, some of them 
recognize that even VFDI could be partly motivated by market-seeking reasons.2 Simply 
it is difficult to imagine that an investor will move its production location to a host 
country, only to export all output to third countries.
Alternative political regimes in the host country may affect the incentive for horizontal 
vis-à-vis vertical FDI, for instance if the cost of expropriation is different for the two 
types of investment. It has been argued that in democratic political regimes, expropriation 
risk is reduced for the foreign investor, along with other sources of risk and uncertainty.3
                                                
1 The “knowledge-capital” (KC) model by Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) acknowledges that FDI has 
both horizontal and vertical elements.
2 See for instance Braconier et al. (2002) and (2005).
3 Jensen (2006) provides empirical evidence on the relationship between democracy and expropriation risk.
4One reason for this is that expropriation can be more costly for democracies: exclusion 
from international markets or less preferential treatment, that is likely to come back as a 
retaliation by foreign partners, might endanger the incumbents’ re-election chances. 
Aizenman (1991) argues that more trade dependency reduces the incentive to default on 
external debt. Since by definition VFDI creates more trade dependency than HFDI, one 
can extend this reasoning and argue that the probability of expropriation by host 
countries would be lower in the case of vertical FDI. Hence, we could expect to see 
relatively more HFDI in democratic countries because of reduced political risk, and 
relatively more VFDI in autocratic countries, as foreign investors anticipate a lower 
probability of expropriation in this case. However, Aizenman and Marion (2004) show 
that expropriation would be more costly for the investors in the case of vertical FDI, since 
it threatens the whole supply-chain. Therefore, whether democracies (autocracies) receive 
more horizontal (vertical) FDI is an empirical question. 
Here we investigate the empirical relation between democracy (autocracy) and the nature
of FDI inflows (vertical versus horizontal) to emerging countries, using a dataset of 14 
source countries and 24 host countries over 1992-2004. Our findings indicate that 
autocracies are likely to receive relatively more FDI of the vertical type, while 
democracies are more likely to be associated with horizontal FDI inflows.
Section two provides a concise review of the recent literature on the economic effects of 
political regimes, the impact of institutions on FDI, and of the behaviour of FDI in the 
presence of political or economic risk. Section three sets simple models of horizontal and 
vertical FDI with a positive probability of expropriation by the host country government, 
and derives a empirically testable equation drawing on them. In sections four, we discuss 
empirical results and advance some alternative explanations for them. Section five 
concludes.
2. Literature
The econometric literature on the relationship between political regime and FDI is recent,
and there are only a few studies that examine this relationship within the scope of the 
‘institutional determinants’ of FDI. The literature on democracy and economic 
5development refers to the relationship between democracy and ‘investment’ mainly as a 
conduit of the relationship between democracy and growth. The question is still debated 
whether democracy promotes growth or not, and the literature on the effects of 
democracy on economic development is divided. Some argue that the relationship is 
positive and significant and the causality runs from democracy to growth (see e.g. Roll 
and Talbott 2003; Papaioannou and Siourounis 2004; Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; 
Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005). Another strand of literature examines the relationship in 
reverse causation, i.e., running from per capita income to democracy (Lipset 1959; 
Acemoglu et al 2005). Others argue that the lack of statistical evidence is due to 
misspecification of the relationship, e.g. failing to account for endogeneity in the 
empirical models and failing to model the democracy-growth relationship as a two-way 
causal relationship (Robinson, 2006). Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006) examine the 
relationship between democracy and growth using meta-regression analysis on 470 
estimates from 81 papers. They find that democracy does not seem to have a direct effect 
on growth. However, it is associated with robust and significant indirect effects on 
growth through higher human capital accumulation, lower inflation and higher economic 
freedom.
In the democracy-economic development literature, a positive relationship between 
democracy and investment is assumed but generally not thoroughly examined. Oliva and 
de Batiz (2002) find an indirect effect of democracy on growth: the rule of law influences 
growth indirectly by encouraging FDI. Persson (2005), and Persson and Tabellini (2006a; 
2006b), argue that if democracy has a positive effect on growth and long-run income, this 
should be channelled by the impact of democracy on investment. They also emphasize 
that investment reacts to expected, not current, returns, hence the persistence and 
credibility of democracy is a key issue. Gerring et al. (2005) find FDI has a positive and 
mostly significant effect on growth when democracy is treated as a stock variable.
Consequently, they suggest that countries’ experience with democracy through history 
helps them to accumulate a democratic capital which can be treated as a stock variable. 
They find that it is a country’s experience with democracy that has a significant effect on 
growth, rather than the current political regime itself. The same idea is also used by 
Persson and Tabellini (2006b). They argue that people’s appreciation of democracy in a 
6given country does not come by overnight, and that “democratic capital” can be 
envisaged as the accumulation of a stock of civic and social assets.
More specific examples of democracy-FDI literature fall under the category of 
‘institutional factors of FDI’. There are only a few studies that examine the effect of 
political regime on FDI, while most empirical work concentrates on the ‘quality of 
institutions’. Using both cross-section and panel data analysis, Busse (2003) finds that 
democracy raises FDI inflows in emerging countries. Busse and Hefeker (2005) show 
that government stability, the absence of internal conflict, and basic democratic rights are 
significant determinants of foreign direct investment inflows. Guerin and Manzocchi
(2006) show that democracy in the host country has a positive effect on North-South FDI 
flows, after controlling for “gravity” variables and privatization proceeds. 
Benassy-Quéré et al (2005) examine the institutional determinants of FDI, mainly 
focusing on ‘institutional quality’ and ‘institutional distance’ concepts. They find that 
‘good institutions’ almost always increase the amount of FDI. This effect, they argue, is 
independent of the effect of GDP per capita. Other studies that discuss the relationship 
between institutions and FDI are Kinoshina and Campos (2003), who focus on transition 
countries; and Méon and Sekkat (2004) who focus on MENA countries.     
There are also some empirical studies that contribute to the FDI-democracy debate from 
the political science side. For example, Li and Resnick (2003) show that when the level 
of property rights protection is controlled for, democracy reduces FDI to developing 
countries. Jakobsen and Soysa (2006) examine the same question and find that such 
negative relationship between democracy and FDI is fully dependent on sample size and 
estimation methodology. Their results support a strong positive relationship between 
democracy and FDI in developing countries. Based on data from insurance companies 
and rating agencies, Jensen (2006) shows that democracy in emerging countries reduces 
expropriation risk for foreign investors.
Although they do not directly examine the democracy-FDI question, Eichengreen and 
Leblang (2006) discuss the relationship between democracy and globalization. Their 
findings indicate that there is a positive two-way relationship between the two variables. 
They argue that there is a positive feedback from financial globalization to political 
democratization: in financially open markets the government and the central bank must 
7be transparent to retain the confidence of the markets, and transparency is detrimental to 
autocratic regimes. Quinn (2000) looks at financial openness and democracy using the 
POLITY dataset of the University of Maryland, while Brune and Guisonger (2003) use 
Przeworski et al’s (2000) democracy indicator. They both report a positive impact of 
democratic openness on financial openness.
In our empirical contribution, we look at the relation between political regime and the 
type of FDI host countries attract. In the literature of the mid-1980s, FDI was 
conceptually separated into two distinct categories: vertical and horizontal. VFDI models 
postulate that the firm can geographically separate production by stages. In the early 
models of Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985), multinationals are firms 
that geographically fragment the production process, and they arise only if countries 
differ sufficiently in their relative endowments of capital and labour. On the other hand, 
HFDI models predict that multinational activity will arise between similar countries, 
given moderate to high trade costs (Markusen, 1984). A puzzling issue here has been the 
scant empirical support for “purely” vertical FDI. As the capital-flow approach to FDI 
indicates, capital should flow from where it is abundant to where it is scarce. However, 
even when one examines North-South FDI flows, relative factor endowments alone do 
not turn out to be significant determinants of FDI. Recently, empirical works on the 
“knowledge capital” model of FDI under imperfect competition have shown that VFDI 
can be accounted for by a combination of factor-endowment differential and country 
economic dimension.4
Our reasoning benefits from an earlier article by Aizenman (1991) who argues that more 
trade dependency mitigates the temptation to default on external debt, as retaliation by 
trade partners makes expropriation more costly. A similar argument can be made for FDI 
expropriation: vertical FDI is associated with greater trade dependency in the host 
country than horizontal FDI, as a larger part of the output generated by FDI is for export, 
hence the costs of trade retaliation should be larger for the host country in the case of the 
nationalization of vertical FDI. Hence, the probability of VFDI expropriation could be 
lower than for HFDI. Interestingly, in a recent paper Aizenman and Marion (2004) 
examine the role of uncertainty on vertical and horizontal FDI. Their model shows that as
                                                
4 See Braconier et al. (2002) and (2005).
8political and economic uncertainty associated with the supply chain increases, the 
expected return on vertical FDI decreases, while the expected return on horizontal FDI 
increases. The rationale is that expropriation of vertical FDI may lead to the disruption of 
the foreign investor’s whole supply chain if production is fragmented, while horizontal 
FDI may allow to diversify risk when political and economic uncertainty rises. 
Consistently, they find evidence that volatility and sovereign risk have a greater negative 
effect on vertical FDI than on horizontal FDI.
Therefore, we can think of two opposite forces at play: on the one hand, trade 
dependency makes the probability of expropriation by the host country lower in the case 
of vertical FDI; on the other hand, expropriation is more costly for foreign investors in 
the case of vertical FDI, as the whole supply chain is at stake. Which of these two effects 
prevails in affecting the type of FDI flowing from advanced to emerging countries, is a 
matter of empirical analysis. We argue in this paper that, to the extent that political 
regimes affect uncertainty or sovereign risk, this will help determine whether the 
Southern host country gets mostly ‘vertical’ or ‘horizontal’ FDI. The following section 
depicts the mechanics of how the probability of expropriation might influence the type of 
FDI flows to emerging countries.
3. Horizontal and vertical FDI, expropriation risk and political regime
We start from a very simple model of the choice of investing abroad in the presence of a 
positive probability of expropriation in the host country. The model draws on Ottaviano 
(2005), and is a static model meant to lead to an empirical equation that can be tested 
with panel data. We consider the choice of a firm located in the North between investing 
or not in a host country in the South, respectively in the case of horizontal and vertical 
FDI. The incentive for horizontal FDI is of “market seeking” nature, while the incentive 
for vertical FDI is due to a “cost saving” element, consistently with most of the recent 
literature.5
                                                
5 “Cost saving” is referred to labour cost only: this means that we do not consider the natural-resource 
motivation for FDI.
9In the case of horizontal FDI (Markusen, 1984), the firm operates under monopolistic 
competition hence it is a price-setter of its own variety of the differentiated good. Price 
exceeds marginal cost:
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where ε is the elasticity of demand perceived by the firm under monopolistic competition.
Operating profits are given by:
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Or, given (2), by
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where E is the total value of sales in a national market. Defining the firm’s market share 
in a given market as
E
qp
s
 one can see that:
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ε
Esπ  (5)
In the case of firms exporting to a national market from abroad, however, there are trade 
costs (modelled as “iceberg” costs) that reduce the value of the firm’s sales:
ε
Eφsπ  (6)
where φ is a measure of the inverse of trade costs or barriers, with 1φ0  .
Let us now define the choice of a Northern firm (which always produces for its own 
national market) between exporting to the Southern country, or going for a horizontal 
FDI meant to serve the Southern internal market. Let us suppose, for simplicity, that both 
a multinational (MNE) and a national (NE) enterprise share the same fixed costs for the 
headquarters (H) and for each productive site (F). Let us also suppose that market size as 
well as demand elasticity are the same in the North and in the South, but that there exists 
a positive probability of expropriation (η) of the FDI by the Southern government. In this 
case, and under the assumption that the entrepreneur is risk neutral, the global profits for 
being multinational are:
  HFF 
ε
sE
1
ε
sEπ MNE  (7)
While for a Northern firm exporting to the South, global profits are:
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HF  ε
sEφ)1(π NE (8)
The firm then becomes multinational if NEMNE ππ   which is equivalent to:
F ε
sE
)-φ1(  (9)
that is the firm will make an horizontal FDI the larger trade costs and market size, and the 
lower the probability of expropriation, given s, F and  ε.6
Let us now turn to the case of vertical FDI (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman 
1985). Here, we assume perfect competition and that the production process can be split
into two steps with different factor intensities, say intermediate production (high capital 
intensity) and assembly (high labour intensity). For a Northern firm, it is always 
convenient to produce the intermediate good at home, while it might be convenient to 
assembly in the Southern country. Once again, there are trade costs (modelled as
“iceberg” costs) that reduce the value of the firm’s sales, but with two additional 
assumptions. First, we assume for simplicity that these costs only pertain to the step of 
selling the assembled good to final customers (or, in other words, that intra-firm trade is 
costless); second, we assume that trade costs are zero in each export market where the 
firm has established some production segment. This amounts to say that once a firm has a 
slice of its production process in two given countries, trading between those two locations
is costless for that firm.7
In this case, each firm produces a constant unit amount of final output which is sold at 
price p to final consumers, and has unit administrative costs (A) for producing in each 
locations, unit costs for producing intermediate components (c) and for assembly (a). 
                                                
6 In equilibrium, the market share s depends on the number of firms that decide to become multinational, 
hence it is endogenous (see Ottaviano, 2005). This, however, does not affects the results concerning the 
relations between FDI, country size and expropriation probability.
7 It would be enough for our purposes to assume that trade costs are lower (instead of nil) between two
locations where the firm has a part of its production process.
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Intermediates are always produced in the Northern country. The unit cost of assembly in 
different countries depends on their relative labour endowments, and it is lower in the 
Southern country a*=α(a), with α less than one.
Ex-ante net revenues for the multinational enterprise are:
     Aacpp 212121R MNE   (10)
where φ is a measure of the inverse of trade costs or barriers, with 1φ0  , γ is the 
share of final production sold either to the source or to the host market, and λ is the 
probability of FDI expropriation by the host country government.
For a firm that does not go for vertical FDI, ex-ante net revenues are:
  Aacpp  1R NE (11)
The risk-neutral firm will make the vertical FDI if ex-ante net revenues are larger under 
multinational production, that is if:
      ppApa  2211-1  (12)
where the terms on the left hand side accounts for the unit labour costs savings of 
fragmentation and the trade cost saving of having two productive locations; while the 
terms on the right hand side represent the additional unit administrative cost, and the 
expropriation risk for the share of output sold to third markets, and the source and host 
market respectively. One can check that vertical FDI is more likely when relative factor 
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endowments are different (small α), when the probability of expropriation is lower, and 
trade costs are larger (in this last case, contrary to the common result in the literature).
4. An empirical model, data and estimation methodology
Let us now move to the empirical model. In the simple setup described above, HFDI is 
only market-seeking, hence there is no role for factor-endowments nor income 
differentials. However, one could expect more HFDI flows between countries that are 
more similar in terms of per-capita GDP, or of relative factor endowments. This is related 
to the so-called “Linder” hypothesis: the more similar countries are in terms of average 
income, the more similar preferences and demand patterns are, hence the larger intra-
industry trade among those countries. This argument can be extended to the case of 
horizontal FDI, which is implemented in order to sell in the host market and is more 
likely to occur among countries that are similar in demand patterns.
As for VFDI, the simple setup of section 3 does not allow - under perfect competition -
any role for market size: typically, one assumes a large number n of identical countries 
such that γ = 1/n. However, if one moves to an imperfect competition setting, market size 
matters for the choice of productive locations, and the larger is a country’s dimension, the 
more convenient it is to locate production there if this is associated with trade cost 
savings. For instance, Braconier et al. (2005) show that vertical FDI in the “knowledge 
capital” model targets large host countries if a share of the final output is not re-exported. 
Drawing on that intuition, larger vertical FDI would be associated with larger economic 
dimensions of both the source and the host country, under our assumptions concerning 
trade costs.
In terms of an empirical equation we approximate market size with GDP of the source 
and the host country, and labour costs a and a* with per capita income in the source and 
the host country. The empirical equation looks like an “augmented” gravity model in its 
canonical multiplicative form:8
                                                
8 See for instance: Head (2003).
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FDI = F [GDP source * b1 x GDP host *b2 x pcgdp source*b3 x pcgdp host * b4] (13)
As we consider FDI flows from the North to the South, we would expect that b1, b2, b3, 
are positive under vertical and horizontal FDI, while b4 is positive under horizontal and 
negative under vertical FDI, as ceteris paribus Northern entrepreneurs look for lower 
labour costs in the Southern locations.
Let us now introduce the effect of the political regime. We test whether different political 
regime are more likely to be associated with vertical or horizontal FDI inflows. A 
rationale for that is the probability of expropriation is different between horizontal and 
vertical FDI, and is variable across political regimes. For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume: first, that democracy is always associated with greater protection of property 
rights and lower expropriation risk, as argued by Persson and Tabellini (2006b) and 
Jensen (2006) among others; second,  that the probability of expropriation is higher for 
horizontal than for vertical FDI in autocracies.
In terms of the empirical model, we interact a political-regime dummy with the host-
country variables in equation (13) and get :
FDI = G [GDP source * b1 x GDP host *(b2 + b3D)x pcgdp source*b4 x pcgdp host * (b5 + b6D)]      (14)
Where D is a dummy that takes value one for a democratic host country, zero otherwise. 
As before, we expect that b1, b2, b3, b4 are positive under vertical and horizontal FDI; in 
addition, we expect here that the sum of b5 and b6 is positive under horizontal and 
negative under vertical FDI.
We estimate log-log versions of equations (13) and (14), with gross bilateral FDI flows 
from Northern (source) to Southern (host) countries. We adopt a random-effects Tobit 
estimator, which has the advantage of preserving the bilateral ‘zero’ FDI entries. If 
potential bilateral North-South flows do not always materialize due to investment 
indivisibilities, or are not recorded as actual FDI due to statistical conventions, it can well 
be that the reported entry of gross FDI inflow is zero, or even negative (e.g. in the case of 
15
large repatriated earnings from South to North country exceeding inflows of equity and 
intra-firm loans to emerging host countries). As we are interested in gross North-South 
inflows, the Tobit model allows us to estimate log-log equations without losing the 
information associated with negative and zero entries in the bilateral North-South FDI 
matrix, provided a transformation is adopted (see Appendix C). If ‘zeros’ represent true 
lack of FDI, dropping this information would lead to biased estimates of the true model 
parameters (see Razin et al, 2005).
The choice between a fixed-effects and a random-effects model, provided individual pair-
country effects are likely to be relevant in this case, is related to the shape of the panel: if 
the time-dimension of the panel is very large relative to the spatial dimension, then it is 
the fixed-effects model that is consistent. However, panel datasets often consist of large 
cross-sections observed over a short period of time, which is also our case (n=364 
bilateral FDI flows; t=13 years). In this case, the fixed-effects estimator produces 
inconsistent results: this is known in the literature as the ‘incidental parameter’ problem 
(Baltagi, 2001). Hence a random-effects Tobit model, “censored” with a zero threshold 
for all values below the minimal actual size of positive FDI gross inflows, is probably 
more suited to estimate equations like (13) and (14) (see for instance Peracchi, 2004). In 
terms of the empirical literature on FDI, we estimate a “gravity-type” model modified to 
account for country-pair individual effects and time dummies.
We use gross bilateral FDI flow data, obtained from the OECD’s International Direct 
Investment Database (2006), which provides data on bilateral FDI inflows and outflows 
over the period 1980-2004 (and with a reasonable coverage for 1992-2004). Other 
authors use either data on affiliate sales or FDI stock data, which are usually less 
homogeneous/less complete but could match the equilibrium allocation of FDI better. 
However, the time span here covers the most recent globalization wave of the 1990s and 
early 2000s, hence our flow data can be seen as describing the response of international 
investors to the new opportunities created after the end of the Cold War and the First Gulf 
War. Each OECD member country reports bilateral “outflows to” and “inflows from” 
other members and a number of partner countries. All values were originally expressed in 
reporting countries’ own national currency units, which were then converted into constant 
2000 USD using OECD’s yearly average exchange rates and the US GDP deflator. There 
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are 14 developed and 25 emerging countries in our sample (see Appendix A for list of 
countries in sample). Other data on the explanatory variables come from various sources 
(see Appendix B). In order to keep the negative and zero observations, we follow Yeyati 
et al. (2003) and use a transformation of the gross inflows as the dependent variable (see 
Appendix C for the details). 
As for the assessment of the political regime, we follow Persson (2005) who uses a 
democracy dummy variable based on the index variable Polity2 from the POLITY IV 
Project. Polity2 is a composite index (ranging from minus 10 to 10) that measures the 
quality of the democracy in a country.9 Our dummy variable takes the value of 1 when 
the host country makes a permanent transition to democracy (i.e. with no further regime 
reversal during the observed period). For the date of transition to democracy, we choose 
the year when the Polity2 index starts taking values larger than zero.
5. Empirical results
The random-effects Tobit estimator we use performs Gauss-Hermite quadrature to 
compute the log likelihood and its derivatives, hence we checked all our results for 
quadrature sensitivity. All results reported are stable, thus they can be confidently 
interpreted.10 We also perform log-likelihood tests of the joint significance of the 
country-pair effects, which do not reject the hypothesis of random effects. The results of
the Tobit regression for equation (13) are reported in Table 1. The economic dimension
of both source and host countries are significant and positive determinants of North-
South FDI flows. However, while per capita GDP of the source country is positive and 
statistically significant, per capita GDP of the host country is not. This indicates that 
while richer countries do invest more FDI in the emerging markets, there is no evidence 
that the poorer among host countries are the ones that attract most of these flows. These 
findings are robust to the inclusion of continent dummies in the regression. Therefore, it 
                                                
9 The Polity2 index is a composite index of the following underlying variables: competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraint on the chief executive, regulation of 
participation and competitiveness of political participation. 
10 We used STATA-Release 9 to perform our tobit regressions. STATA recommends that the results from the 
model estimated by 12 quadratures (default) points be compared to results from 16 quadrature points. If the 
relative difference in the estimated coefficients is larger than 1%, then the coefficients are not stable. If this 
is the case, it may be that the random-effects estimator is the wrong model. 
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is not clear from Table 1 whether North-South FDI flows are mostly of the ‘vertical’ or 
‘horizontal’ type.
We then add more control variables to the benchmark model, some of them commonly 
used as determinants of FDI. In Table 2, the benchmark model is augmented by the log of 
trade flows between country pair. In order to avoid an endogeneity bias, this variable is 
lagged by one-period. Theoretically, trade and FDI are related and they are partly driven 
by similar factors, hence the economic impact of some variables, such as countries’ size 
are significantly diminished. FDI inflows into emerging markets are positively correlated 
with trade flows: country-pairs that trade more also exchange larger FDI flows. However, 
per capita GDP in the host country remains not significant. 
In Table 3, we introduce privatization proceeds in the host country as a control variable. 
First, privatization policies might directly affect FDI as they influence the supply of asset 
potentially available for foreign investors; second, privatization proceeds are an 
“objective” measure of market-oriented reform in emerging economies (in the 
terminology introduced by Campos and Horvath, 2006).11 Privatization proceeds are 
positively and significantly correlated with FDI inflows as expected, and controlling for 
privatization all GDP and per capita income variables are statistically significant. Per 
capita GDP in the host country has a positive sign, suggesting that North-South FDI 
flows match the horizontal pattern better. 
In Table 4, we also control for EU accession with a dummy for countries that start EU 
membership negotiations. The EU dummy can be also viewed as a proxy for economic 
and democratic reform. The results on per capita GDP in the host country are 
inconclusive, hence we cannot tell whether North-South FDI flows are vertical or 
horizontal.
In Table 5 we interact the democracy dummy variable with GDP and GDP per capita of 
host economy as suggested by equation (14). The results in the first column indicate a 
negative and statistically significant GDP per capita of the host economy. This indicates 
that autocratic countries tend to receive relatively more vertical FDI. On the other hand, 
GDP per capita of the host country interacted with democracy dummy variable is 
                                                
11 Carstens and Toubal  (2003) suggest a measure of privatization method in Central Eastern European 
countries, but based on subjective evaluations.
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positive, statistically significant, and that the sum of b5 and b6 is positive. This suggests 
that democratic host countries tend to receive relatively more horizontal FDI. These 
results are robust to the inclusion of EU control variables, i.e. the EU dummy and an 
interaction term between privatization proceed and EU membership negotiation. 
Although the GDP interacted with democracy dummy is statistically insignificant, the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient for GDP indicates that size also matters: 
in case of autocratic countries, it is the larger ones that receive more FDI.12
Finally, Table 6 shows that these results are robust to the inclusion of a more refined 
intercept dummy that captures the impact on the constant of the degree of 
democratization of the host countries (that is, the original value of the Polity2 variable 
ranging to minus 10 to 10, from less to more democratic countries). Furthermore, the 
intercept dummy is statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that we have both 
an overall positive effect of democracy on the volume of FDI inflows, and an effect on 
the nature of FDI, more oriented towards horizontal in democracies and more towards 
vertical in autocracies.
Overall, the empirical analysis shows that using only the standard control variables from 
the literature, it is difficult to differentiate between types of FDI inflows to emerging 
economies. However, the features of the political regime (in our simple case, democracy 
vs. autocracy) seem to affect the nature of FDI flows, beyond their volume. The effect of 
democracy (autocracy) in promoting horizontal (vertical) FDI could be explained through 
its effect on the uncertainty surrounding property rights in the host economy. According 
to this interpretation, not only democracy reduces the risk of expropriation in the host 
economy, but it could be less costly for an autocracy to expropriate horizontal foreign 
investment directed to its domestic market, rather than vertical FDI that is partially 
intended for re-exporting. Vertical FDI increases the host country’s trade dependency, 
and make it more vulnerable to trade retaliation in the aftermath of nationalization (or of 
                                                
12 We have tested whether these findings are mainly driven by a China-effect, and replicated the regression 
excluding China. While we still find evidence that democratic (autocratic) countries receive more 
horizontal (vertical) FDI, the coefficients are estimated less precisely, and are significant at the 10% level. 
However, we have few autocracies in the emerging country sample (one sixth of the total) and reducing 
them further could make the exercise less reliable.
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default, as originally suggested by Aizenman, 1991). As foreign investors anticipate that, 
they allocate relatively more vertical FDI to autocratic countries.13
An alternative interpretation is that the effect of the political regime on FDI works
through its differential effects on labor standards. Rodrik (1999) reports that democracies 
pay higher wages. In his framework, the effect of democracy should have a direct effect 
on wages. Moreover, Palley (2005) shows that if the effect of democracy works through
labor standards, it would not be immediately captured by per capita GDP nor wages. It 
might then be the case that autocracies can ensure more “stable” and “less conflicting” 
labour-capital relations, at least to the point the political regime is viable. This could 
provide relatively more incentive for vertical FDI in autocracies, as vertical FDI to 
emerging countries is typically more labour intensive.
6. Conclusions
In this study, we focus on the relationship between democracy and the nature of foreign 
direct investment flows from developed countries to emerging market countries. In order 
to address this question, we introduce an expropriation risk possibly related to the 
political regime in a simple model of FDI where horizontal FDI is mainly “market-
seeking”, while vertical FDI is mainly “cost-saving”. However, as recent evidence
suggests that market-seeking and cost-saving motivations for VFDI could co-exit, while 
the “Linder effect” could matter for HFDI, we fix the empirical equations accordingly.
We test these equations using random-effect Tobit regressions on a set of bilateral FDI 
flows from 14 developed countries to 24 emerging market countries over 1992-2004. 
This estimation technique has the advantage of preserving the ‘zero’ observations of 
bilateral FDI flows. When we model North-South FDI flows as a function of size and per 
capita income of source and host countries only, plus a set of time-invariant country-pair 
specific effects, we cannot discriminate between the vertical and the horizontal FDI
hypothesis. This is true even when we augment our benchmark equation to control for
                                                
13 Recall that we do not consider the natural-resource motivation for FDI: if also resource-seeking FDI is 
classified as “vertical”,  this interpretation would have to be qualified. Consequently, fully oil-dependent 
emerging economies are not considered in our country sample.
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continent dummies, lagged bilateral trade flows, privatization proceeds and a EU 
negotiation dummy. 
We then interact a democracy dummy variable, as a proxy for political regime in the host 
country, with GDP and per capita income of the host countries. Democracies seem to 
attract relatively more FDI of the horizontal type, whereas non-democratic regimes
appear to receive relatively more FDI in the form of vertical FDI. Furthermore, when we 
add an intercept dummy that proxies for the “degree of democratization”, we also find 
that more advanced democracies get larger FDI whatsoever. We conclude that the 
political regime of the host country has an effect both on the amount and on the nature of 
FDI inflows.
One explanation is that democracy reduces all sorts of political expropriation risk. 
Moreover, if an autocratic country find it less costly to expropriate horizontal rather than 
vertical FDI, and foreign investors anticipate that, then autocracies could attract relatively 
more “vertical” investment.
In future research, we plan consider the ‘control’ motivation for FDI more carefully. The 
multinational may prefer FDI over other forms of investment since there are sizable 
information costs/asymmetries in the host country market, such as low intellectual 
property rights protection. In future research, we plan to elaborate on this aspect of FDI.
We do not consider here natural-resource oriented FDI either. Moreover, this study 
postulates a simple relationship between the (amount of) different types of FDI and the
political regime. In future research, we plan to examine a more complex relationship 
where the stock of FDI may affect the dynamics of the political regime in host countries.
Further empirical extensions would move in the direction of improving our FDI measure 
and enlarging the country sample; checking for robustness when wage compensation is 
used instead of per capita income; testing reliable (and objective) direct measures of 
expropriation risk; and refining the political regime variable allowing, for instance, to 
distinguish between presidential and parliamentary democracies.14  
                                                
14 This is difficult here because almost all parliamentary democracies in our sample are in Central Eastern 
Europe, hence there is an overlap with the regional dummy effect.
21
Table 1. Benchmark Empirical Model  
Dependent variable: FDI Inflows I II
GDP of source 2.29
(0.21)***
2.31
(0.20)***
GDP of host 1.19
(0.22)***
1.79
(0.26)***
per capita GDP of source 3.07
(0.82)***
3.20
(0.81)***
per capita GDP of host 0.48
(0.28)*
0.29
(0.28)
Time dummy variables Yes Yes
Continent dummies No Yes
N (uncensored, censored) 3780 
(2925, 855)
3780 
(2925, 855)
Log-likelihood -11404.23 -11394.48
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 (probability) 288.13 (0.00) 261.23 (0.00)
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 2. The effect of bilateral trade on FDI inflows
Dependent variable: Inflows I II
GDP of source 0.47
(0.27)*
0.46
(0.27)*
GDP of host -0.04
(0.23)
0.35
(0.27)
per capita GDP of source 2.81
(0.74)***
2.92
(0.73)***
per capita GDP of host 0.56
(0.26)**
0.21
(0.28)
Lagged bilateral trade 2.12
(0.23)***
2.14
(0.24)***
Time dummy variables Yes Yes
Continent dummies No Yes
N (uncensored, censored) 3565
(2765, 800)
3565 
(2765, 800)
Log-likelihood -10721.219 -10714.463
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 
(probability)
145.39 (0.00) 127.98 (0.00)
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
and *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 3. The effect of privatization proceeds on FDI inflows
Dependent variable: Inflows I II
GDP of source 2.18
(0.21)***
0.44
(0.27)*
GDP of host 0.94
(0.24)***
-0.18
(0.28)
per capita GDP of source 2.31
(0.84)***
2.08
(0.73)***
per capita GDP of host 0.59
(0.31)***
-0.08
(0.36)
Privatization proceeds 0.34
(0.11)***
0.35
(0.11)***
Lagged bilateral trade 2.15
(0.24)***
Time dummy variables Yes Yes
Continent dummies No Yes
N 2665 2599
Log-likelihood -8086.996 -7840.5811
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
and *** significant at 1%.  
24
Table 4. The effect of EU membership negotiations
Dependent variable: Inflows I II
GDP of source 2.31
(0.20)***
2.19
(0.21)***
GDP of host 1.85
(0.26)***
1.19
(0.28)***
per capita GDP of source 3.21
(0.79)***
2.33
(0.83)***
per capita GDP of host 0.04
(0.29)
0.37
(0.40)
EU negotiations dummy 1.95 (0.59)*** 1.11 (0.66)*
Privatization proceeds 0.30
(0.11)***
Time dummy variables Yes Yes
Continent dummies Yes Yes
N 
(uncensored, censored)
3780
(2925, 855)
2665 
(2130, 535)
Log-likelihood -11389.08 -8084.66
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 
(probability)
237.68 (0.00) 166.24 (0.00)
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent and *** significant at 1 percent.  
25
Table 5. The effect of democracy on FDI inflows
Dependent variable: Inflows I II III
GDP of source 2.18
(0.21)***
2.18
(0.20)***
2.19
(0.21)***
GDP of host 1.34
(0.44)***
1.38
(0.44)***
1.36
(0.44)***
per capita GDP of source 2.29
(0.83)***
2.28
(0.82)***
2.27
(0.82)***
per capita GDP of host -2.02
(0.87)**
-1.95
(0.87)**
-2.00
(0.87)**
GDP of host * Democracy -0.53
(0.50)
-0.46
(0.50)
-0.45
(0.50)
per capita GDP of host * 
Democracy
2.68
(0.91)***
2.48
(0.92)***
2.56
(0.92)***
Democracy -4.41
(14.63)
-4.67
(14.58)
-5.52
(14.60)
Privatization proceeds 0.38
(0.11)***
0.35
(0.11)***
0.41
(0.12)***
EU negotiations dummy 0.92
(0.65)
3.32
(1.79)**
Privatization*EU dummy -0.39
(0.27)
Time dummy variables Yes Yes Yes
Continent dummies No No No
N (uncensored, censored) 2665 2665 2665
Log-likelihood -8079.95 -8078.96 -8077.93
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 
(probability)
170.14 (0.00) 161.37(0.00) 162.68 (0.00)
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 6. The effect of democracy on FDI inflows (Polity 2)
Dependent variable: Inflows I II
GDP of source 2.21
(0.20)***
2.21
(0.20)***
GDP of host 2.30
(0.40)***
2.30
(0.40)***
per capita GDP of source 2.34
(0.81)***
2.34
(0.81)***
per capita GDP of host -3.07
(0.98)***
-3.03
(0.98)***
GDP of host * Democracy -1.07
(0.30)***
-1.05
(0.30)***
per capita GDP of host * 
Democracy
3.47
(0.96)***
3.40
(0.97)***
Degree of democratization 
(Polity 2 variable)
0.34
(0.13)***
0.34
(0.14)***
Privatization proceeds 034
(0.10)***
0.33
(0.11)***
EU negotiations dummy 0.34
(0.68)
Time dummy variables Yes Yes
Continent dummies Yes Yes
N (uncensored, censored) 2665 2665
Log-likelihood -8072.47 -8072.34
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 
(probability)
149.82 (0.00) 148.73 (0.00)
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.  
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APPENDIX A
Our dataset includes bilateral FDI data for 14 North source countries and for 24 South host 
countries over 1992-2004 (336 cross-sections by 13 years).
List of countries in sample:
Source countries
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK and US
Host Countries (year of permanent democratization according to the POLITY IV dataset of the 
University of Maryland)
Argentina (1983), Bulgaria (1990), Brazil (1985), Chile (1989), China (-), Colombia (1957), Czech 
Republic (1993), Egypt (-), Hungary (1989), Indonesia (1999), India (1950), South Korea (1987), 
Mexico (1994), Malaysia (1957), Morocco (-), Philippines (1986), Poland (1989), Russia (1992), 
Romania (1990), South Africa (1910), Slovakia (1993), Slovenia (1991), Thailand (1992) and 
Turkey (1983).
APPENDIX B
Data definition and sources
Gross FDI inflows: Foreign Direct Investment inflows from source country to host country in 
constant 2000 US dollars (OECD International Investment Statistics Yearbook, 2006). 
GDP: Gross domestic product in constant 2000 US dollars USD (World Economic Outlook 
Database, IMF).
per capita GDP: Gross domestic per capita in constant 2000 US dollars (World Economic Outlook, 
IMF).
32
Bilateral trade: Bilateral exports from source country to host country in constant 2000 US dollars 
USD (Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF).
Education: Average years of schooling of the total population age 25 and over, (Barro-Lee, 2000).
Privatization proceeds: Privatization proceeds in constant 2000 US dollars (World Bank).
Democracy dummy: dummy variable taking value one when the political regime is a democracy, 
zero otherwise.
EU dummy: dummy taking value one for the year an emerging country starts EU membership 
negotiations and afterwards (and zero for the period before).
APPENDIX C
In order to avoid the loss of valuable information, the dependent variable is transformed. For large 
values of inflwit , ln (inflwit +1)  ln(inflwit ). For small values ln (inflwit +1)  inflwit , hence this 
transformation resembles a semi-log relationship. Different versions of this transformation were 
used by Eichengreen and Irwin (1996), Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Wei (2000). This 
transformation takes care of zero observations, leaving out negative observations of direct 
investment. Yeyati et al. (2003) offer a solution to this problem by the following transformation:     
inflwit  = ln [|inflwit |+1]  [sign (inflwit)]
By this transformation, negative values are retained, and the coefficients from a linear regression 
can still be interpreted as elasticities for large values of the dependent variable. For this reason, we 
measure FDI inflows in dollars (not millions) and hence adding 1 is equivalent to adding one dollar 
to gross inflows.    
